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Housing the
Homeless Through
Expanding Access
to Existing
Housing Subsidies
Barbara Sard

The premise of this article is that homelessness in America today is essentially a product
of the lack of affordable housing for very low-income people. The article outlines this
central income /housing gap analysis as the factual predicate of the goal to alleviate
homelessness through securing subsidized housing resources for the homeless and imminently homeless. It explains why, based

on the nature and number of annually available

housing subsidies, expanding access to existing housing subsidies

is

a valuable, work-

immediate crisis of lack of affordable
housing, albeit one which does not negate the acknowledged necessity of increasing the
supply of such subsidies. It suggests six strategies legal advocates may pursue to expand
access for the homeless to the existing housing subsidy resources in their community.
able, short-term, at least partial solution to the

Finally, questions are raised

about the value of this approach,

in contrast to

a focus

on increasing the overall supply of income or housing subsidies, for which space
permits only limited and tentative answers.
solely

Homelessness in America today is essentially a product of the lack of affordable
housing for very low-income people. While "macro" solutions in the form of
increased incomes, an increased

number

supply of lower-cost housing are

vital,

effort. If

of subsidies for housing, and an increased

they require years of political and legislative

only macro solutions will solve the problem, what are lawyers representing

homeless

clients

today to do?

Is

there a legal strategy available to assist these clients

to solve their central problem, the lack of a place to live that they can afford?

answer

is

yes,

through expanding access to existing housing subsidies.

The

1

Why is Expanding Access a Worthwhile Approach?
The current

crisis

of homelessness in our society

is

primarily the result of the

increasing gap between household income and housing costs. While individual

dysfunctions

may

help determine which families or individuals are most vulnerable

to the shortfall in the supply of housing that the
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cause of the worst homelessness epidemic since the Great Depression

is

increasing

poverty in the face of a decreasing supply of low-cost housing. 2

What the
ability

too

little

many

confluence of these forces means, in practical terms, with regard to the

of the private housing market to meet housing needs,
low-cost housing in a

community

for those

that either there

is

who need

it

is

or, particularly in

of the country's major urban areas, which experienced extreme inflation in

is virtually no private market housing within the
economic reach of the homeless. Nor can the private housing market, without substantial government subsidies, increase the supply of housing that the homeless or
imminently homeless can afford.
Consequently, the solution to the income/housing gap lies in closing the gap from
either, or both, directions: by increasing their income so the homeless can afford whatever housing there is, and/or by increasing the supply of housing subsidies. Even in
areas of the country where the housing stock is such that increased incomes or housing
purchasing power would substantially alleviate the problem, it is extremely difficult to
muster the political will to expand and increase public assistance income maintenance
programs, which could provide such income. This is even more true in communities
where housing costs have escalated. The same can be said for the political barriers that
exist to the creation of the kind of job training plus public employment (and child
care) programs which are necessary if any substantial number of the homeless are to
increase their incomes through employment rather than income transfers.
Thus, whether by choice or necessity, the primary solution to the income/housing
gap is to increase the amount of subsidized housing 4 available to the homeless and
imminently homeless. One obvious way to accomplish this goal is to legislate an
increase in deep subsidy housing programs and require all or some significant portion of the increased resources to go to the homeless and imminently homeless. In
light of the enormous shortfall between housing needs and housing supply, a strategy directed at "more" is certainly vital. Without it, we will not end the national dis-

housing costs in the 1980s, there

3

grace of homelessness.

However, whether
of housing

is

it is possible to generate the political will to increase the supply
perhaps as doubtful as the possibility of creating the political will to

incomes of the poor. While the struggle to increase the

substantially increase the
total supply of

housing continues in these tight

homeless,

imperative to look to whether the existing supply of subsidized hous-

ing

is

it is

being

fully utilized

or

is

fiscal times, to assist

going to those legally entitled

to,

the currently

and most

in

need

of,

such subsidies. There are additional strategies available to homeless people and
their advocates to increase the proportion of the existing supply of subsidized hous-

homeless and imminently homeless. As these strategies can
immediate housing solutions for at least some of the homeless,
they can be used by lawyers and others working with individual homeless clients and
client groups to "solve" their clients' problems. I outline six strategies to maximize
access of the homeless and imminently homeless to existing housing subsidies and
briefly review some of the questions they raise. While I draw heavily on my experience in Massachusetts, the strategies should be replicable elsewhere.
ing

which goes

to the

result in virtually

Subsidies Exist

Currently, there are three major kinds of deeply subsidized federal housing pro-

grams. "Walk-around" rental subsidies, usually

188

known

as Section 8 certificates or

vouchers, issued by public housing authorities (PHAs), can be used by the holder to
rent a housing unit of acceptable quality. Public housing consists of housing units

owned and

usually

managed by

a

PHA,

in

which the tenant's rent

is

limited to 30

percent of income. Privately owned, federally subsidized developments have
"project-based" subsidies available to

Some

some or

all

of the tenants

who move

into

fund deep subsidy housing programs, which
may be similar in program design to the federal programs.
As of 1988, 2.3 million households received Section 8 subsidies, most of which were
those developments.

walk-around

states also

certificates or vouchers.

housing units managed by PHAs.

Also as of 1988, there were 1.4 million public
privately owned housing constructed or sub-

Of the

stantially rehabilitated with federal funds, in addition to those with Section 8 subsi-

dies included above, there are several

Besides the relatively small
for

hundred thousand deeply subsidized

number of additional new

units.

subsidies or subsidized units

which funds have been appropriated by Congress each year, a not insignificant

number of units and subsidies annually become available as current tenants leave or
become ineligible for continued subsidy. No national data appear to be maintained
on the number and type of such "turnover" subsidies. If the Massachusetts experience

is

typical,

however, approximately 10 percent of Section 8s turn over and are

The turnover rate for public housing in Massomewhat less: state officials have estimated that approxi-

available for reissuance each year.

sachusetts appears to be

mately 5 percent of public housing units turn over each year, although the rate

much

is

higher at the violence-plagued inner-city projects in Boston. Extrapolating

from these

rates,

it is

likely that

roughly 330,000 such units are available for reas-

signment each year.

even were they all targeted annually to the homemeet the need (and we must not forget that the "need"
extends beyond those who are already homeless or at immediate risk of becoming
homeless), it is surely not an insignificant figure. Ironically, it is more than sufficient
to house the number of homeless estimated by the Reagan administration in 1983.

While 330,000 deep

less,

subsidies,

are inadequate to

5

Potential Strategies to

Maximize Access

My premise is that, currently,

a relatively small proportion of the existing deeply

subsidized housing resources which turn over each year are reissued to the
less,

or even the imminently homeless. 6

The reasons

home-

for this are several. First, house-

holds with a fairly broad range of incomes are eligible for federally subsidized housing programs. Families with incomes
eligible for all

up

to 50 percent of the area

median income are

deeply subsidized federal housing assistance programs. Families with

even higher incomes are eligible. While many families nearer the upper end of these
income limits undoubtedly have housing needs, they are unlikely to be homeless
without housing assistance. Second, Congress has defined the categories of applicants

who must receive

preference for federal housing resources far

more broadly

than the currently or imminently homeless or displaced, as applicants living in substandard housing or paying more than 50 percent of their income for housing costs
also receive preference. Finally,

many homeless

applicants are excluded from partic-

ipation in subsidized housing programs as a result of the policies

and practices

described below.

How existing deeply subsidized housing resources are distributed may usefully be
categorized into

six

problem

areas. Successful efforts
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toward challenge or reform

in
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the following areas should result in a substantial increase in the resources allocated

whose need is the greatest:
The failure of subsidized housing owners and PHAs

to those
1.

to utilize available con-

tracted federally funded subsidies
2.

The violation of the

federal preference rules by

many PHAs and

subsidized

owners
3.

The

failure of

most public housing authorities and subsidized owners

to give

top priority to the homeless

The

maze through which

subsidized housing resources are
hundreds of applications to be filed in order to maximize the opportunity for a homeless applicant to obtain available resources
5. Procedural barriers erected by the housing authorities and subsidized housing
owners, which have a particularly harsh impact on the homeless
6. Discrimination by many public housing authorities and subsidized housing
owners against disabled and handicapped applicants who are not mobility impaired.
4.

administrative

delivered, requiring literally

Failure to Utilize Federally

Funded Subsidies

When Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation projects were funded

HUD

HUD

in the 1970s,
entered into contracts with the owners to subsidize,
by
through the Section 8 program, the rent of families in a specified number of units,
so that each such family would have to pay only the percentage of family income for
rent required under the Section 8 program. Rather than utilizing all these subsidies,
owners of an increasing number of projects have been renting what should have
been subsidized units at market rates.
Because of standing barriers erected by some federal courts to challenges to such
underutilization by applicants, it has been difficult through litigation to remedy the
problem and make these funded subsidies available to needy families. In the
Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Congress has effectively
reversed the prior appellate decision, as well as making clear that owners are legally
obligated to use their full contract authority to rent to income-eligible families. Consequently, litigation to enforce the use of all available subsidies should now be possible. At least 70 percent of the subsidized units that become available under this law
must go to federal preference holders, including the homeless.
While the Cranston-Gonzalez amendments have, on the whole, made it far more
straightforward to achieve full utilization of deep subsidies in privately owned developments, the mere enactment of this law is not likely to alter the predilection of
owners to rent to more affluent tenants. Thus, enforcement may well be necessary to
realize the increased availability of subsidies that the law requires. Rather than the

highly laborious
in

work required

any particular development, 7

agency,

if

not

HUD,

to

to determine
it

may be

whether there are unutilized subsidies

possible to induce, or require, a state

undertake such enforcement work.

Public housing authorities administering Section 8 existing and Section 8 voucher

programs may also have contracted and funded Section 8 subsidies available, which
they are unlawfully failing to distribute. For the last several years, the Worcester,
Massachusetts, Housing Authority failed to allocate over 340 Section 8 certificates
and vouchers, approximately 30 percent of its total portfolio. In mid- 1990, the
Chelsea, Massachusetts, Housing Authority decided to stop issuing its available Section 8 subsidies. Neither of these housing authorities turned these funded resources
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back to

HUD for reallocation to PHAs willing to use them, so available federal

funds for deep subsidies simply went unutilized.
placed the

When

legal services attorneys

HUD regional office formally on notice of the blatant failure of these

PHAs to comply with federal

policy, and, at least in Chelsea, the

discriminatory motivation for such failure,

and require the

PHAs to

issue

and

lease,

probable racially

HUD did intervene, without litigation,

up

to available subsidies, to applicants

selected in accordance with federal law.

Violation of the Federal Preference Rules

were distributed on a

first come, first
maintained by each housing authority. In recognition of the enormous shortage of housing resources in relation to
need, particularly after the drastic cutbacks in federal funding for low-income hous-

Traditionally, subsidized housing resources

served basis through a chronological waiting

ing that

began

in the early eighties,

list

Congress directed that certain categories of

applicant families be given preference over earlier ("standard") applicants not qualifying for preference in the various federal housing programs. In January 1988,
finally

HUD

promulgated regulations to implement these federal preferences.

Under

current law, federal preference

is

given to three categories of applicants:

those occupying substandard housing (including the homeless), involuntarily displaced, or paying

more than 50 percent of their income

for rent.

The

substantial

majority of federally subsidized housing resources must be distributed to applicants
qualifying for

one of these preferences. While

preferences to rank
least

all

PHAs and owners may use

federal preference holders,

all

"local"

applicants qualifying under at

one of the federal preference categories must come before applicants who do

not qualify for federal preference, with minor exceptions.

Because of the preferred status that proper implementation of the federal preference regulations gives to homeless applicants (at least those who meet the federal
definition), it is potentially critical to homeless applicants' achieving relatively quick
receipt of a housing subsidy that

PHAs and subsidized owners grant federal prefer-

ence to homeless applicants who are entitled to it and that they abide by the requirement that federal preference holders come before standard applicants.

The only data

HUD appears to keep on PHA implementation of the federal pref-

erence regulations are

in the individual

authorities. It appears that

management

audits of particular housing

HUD audits emphasize units or certificates wrongly

who may have been wrongly denied.
Based on two years of experience of the Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS)
Homelessness Unit representing applicants for federal preference at a variety of
PHAs and private federally subsidized owners in eastern Massachusetts, however, I
believe that there may be widespread violation of the federal regulations. For example, in a medium-size housing authority right next to Boston, GBLS discovered that
41 percent of the Section 8 certificates awarded in the first eighteen months after
the federal preference regulations went into effect went to non-federal preference
holders, at a time when the PHA admitted that it had federal preference holders on
issued, rather than checking cases of applicants

its

waiting

list.

Such a violation of the fundamental rule of federal preference holders first can
occur for a variety of reasons, beyond the straightforward legal violation that
appears to have occurred at this PHA. At many PHAs in Massachusetts, we have
found that the PHAs' federal preference "system" does not on its face comply with
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federal law, usually either because

it

omits any mention of groups mandated by the

federal regulations as federal preference holders and/or because

some groups, deemed

to have "local" preference but

who do

not

explicitly places

it

fit

into any of the

federal preference categories, in a ranking above federal preference holders.

have also found

PHAs which,

in their application of their

federal preference status to applicants

Such practices not only

We

preference plans, deny

who come within the federal definitions.
who are legally entitled to federal

result in applicants

preference status being denied such status, and therefore probably subsidized housing as well, but also

make

holders on the waiting

list

it

possible,

depending on the number of federal preference

cants without federal preference to obtain
if

a

number of available resources, for applimore of the available subsidies. In addition,

in relation to the

PHA closes its waiting list for Section 8 applicants when its waiting list contains

any standard applicants or when it has a ranked preference system and
tains applicants with less than first preference, it is likely that the PHA

its list
is

con-

unlawfully

denying the right of an applicant claiming federal preference status to be placed on
the waiting list. As a consequence of such unlawful closing, applicants entitled to
federal preference status are substantially delayed in their receipt of housing assistance, or totally denied such right.

By

aggressive representation of applicants for subsidized housing resources,

it

should be possible to remedy these violations and enforce homeless applicants'
rights as federal preference holders.

HUD could be made to take
light

of the fact that actions

number of PHAs (although

More

its

However,

it

would

be more efficient
more seriously, in

certainly

role as grantor of federal funds

if

may otherwise have
class or

to be brought against a very large
group defendant actions could be possible).

aggressive congressional oversight could induce such action

could also be a worthwhile strategy to sue

HUD for

its

on HUD's part. It
implement

failure to properly

the federal housing laws, including the fair housing laws, as violation of the federal

preference rules

is

likely to

have a

racially discriminatory effect.

Failure to Give Top Priority to the Homeless

Public housing agencies and private subsidized owners administering federally sub-

programs subject to the federal preference regulations have the
under the HUD regulations, to rank the federal preference categories,
or even subgroups within the categories. Where subsidized housing resources are
sidized housing
authority,

insufficient to serve all applicants entitled to federal preference within a reasonable
if homelessness were
be ranked as the top preference category. 8 In addition, public housing authorities
could require that the homeless receive all or a substantial portion of the 30 percent
of units with project-based assistance for which they have discretion to set local,

period of time, homeless applicants would benefit substantially
to

nonfederal preference for admission.

HUD does not keep any centralized records, nor has it issued any reports, of
what preference systems have been adopted by PHAs, so it is impossible to say with
any precision what percentage of PHAs or owners administering federal housing
resources accord top preference to the homeless within a ranked preference system.
If the Massachusetts experience is typical, however, most PHAs, at least the smaller
ones, and most private owners of federally subsidized units do not rank the federal
preferences at all. Of those which do have a ranked system, the homeless are ranked
first in

few cases.
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two approaches to accomplishing top ranking of homeless
applicants for federal housing resources in particular areas: persuasion or mandate.
9
Persuasion may be grounded on public policy-relative need arguments alone, or
enhanced by a fiscal "incentive," such as occurs when the costs of emergency shelter
will be reduced by targeting housing resources at the families who would otherwise
be sheltered at enormous state expense. A mandate can be achieved through admin10
istrative rule making by a supervisory state housing agency, legislation, or court
order. Politics will probably dictate whether administrative or legislative advocacy is
likely to be fruitful in a particular state. While no court has, to my knowledge, yet
issued such an order, it is within a court's equitable power to do so where executive
branch liability for homelessness of a particular group has been found, and where
there may be no, or insufficient, appropriated funds available to fashion a remedy.

There are

basically

Balkan ized Administration of Programs
When a person in the United States wishes to apply for Social Security benefits, he
or she goes to the Social Security Administration office that serves the local area.

The

is eligible to receive are the same regardless of where in the
and the time it takes to receive benefits after application is
unlikely to vary according to where the person applies. The same situation occurs
for persons wishing to apply for unemployment compensation or public assistance
benefits, although the benefits vary in each state.
In contrast to virtually all other major government benefit programs for individuals, however, anyone wishing to apply for subsidized housing has to make literally
hundreds of applications in any particular state in order to maximize the chances of
receiving benefits. This can be true even in a state where the only subsidized housing
programs are federally funded.
Such balkanized distribution of a basic resource is a product of the localized
system of funding conduits established by Congress for federal housing dollars. In
the first thirty years of federal housing programs, funding essentially went into
public housing programs, through contracts with public housing authorities estab-

benefits the person

U.S.A. the person

lives,

lished pursuant to state law. Generally, the jurisdiction of a

town
only
In

lines,

although regional or even statewide

fifty states,

some

states,

approximately 2,000

an applicant must

file

PHAs to maximize his or her chance

PHAs

PHA follows city or

are possible. While

PHAs administer a federal

separate applications at literally hundreds of
of receiving a walk-around Section 8 subsidy,

even though such subsidies can now be used anywhere in the state (and
contiguous areas of neighboring states).
Complicating matters further,

be

filed for their public

we have

Section 8 program.

PHAs frequently require

in

some

a separate application to

housing and Section 8 project-based programs, in addition

certificates and vouchers. Then, in
which one might wish to submit one or
several applications, to receive a project-based subsidized unit at one of the potentially hundreds of privately owned and federally or state subsidized developments
in an area, a separate application must be made to each project.
Not only are there hundreds of PHAs or private developments to which one
should apply to maximize one's chances of receiving a housing subsidy, but each
PHA or private developer is free, under federal law, to adopt its own system for
ranking the federal preferences. State-funded resources may be distributed under

to the application for

walk-around Section 8

addition to the tens or hundreds of

PHAs

at
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from the federal preferences. While at least the PHA plans and rules
is no one place to get them. No government
agency gathers them all, nor is any government agency required to collect turnover
and waiting list information.
Consequently, it is impossible for a homeless applicant desperate for housing

rules different

11
are technically publicly available, there

to act like the proverbial rational person, choosing to apply at those agencies/

developments where they are likely to have the best chance of getting housing in
light of the fit between their circumstances and the applicable tenant selection rules
and the relative availability of new or turnover resources in the bedroom size they
need.

While major urban centers may have years-long waiting

lists

even for federal

preference holders, the experience in Massachusetts has been that

PHAs in small

communities frequently have relatively few federal preference holders on their waiting lists. A homeless applicant who is legally entitled to preference may then be able
to receive a housing subsidy fairly quickly from an outlying community in the suburban ring or even in a distant rural area. Even if the family does not wish to move to
the grantee community, a Section 8 walk-around subsidy can be used to rent housing
in the urban area of origin, or any other community in the state to which the person
wishes to move.
While federal law permits this balkanized "system" of distributing federal housing
resources, it does not require it, at least in its current extreme form. Just as states
could require all PHAs and private owners with federally subsidized resources to
comply with a state-ordered system for ranking federal preference holders, states
could also require PHAs and owners to submit information about likely availability
of units to a central or regional clearinghouse, and litigation could provoke them to
mandate such reporting. States could also reduce the barriers created by balkanized
administration by requiring PHAs and private subsidized owners to accept applications by mail, and to use the same application form, which could be photocopied and
sent to the long

list

of distributors of subsidized housing resources.

While such state-level strategies only tinker with the federally created balkanized
system, which can best be altered by changing federal law, implementation of clearinghouses and streamlined application processes should help increase the consciousness of the sharp inconsistency between the nature of current housing subsidy programs, in which approximately half the resources are portable income subsidies, and
the outdated localized manner in which housing resources are now distributed, and
of the need for change.
Procedural Barriers

Achieving access to existing subsidized housing resources requires surmounting a
number of procedural barriers, which create particular difficulty for the homeless.

For example, PHAs frequently refuse to take any applications for their Section 8
programs, even from federal preference holders, on the grounds that their lists are
"closed." People who do manage to get their names on the waiting list are frequently
"purged," for failure to respond to a letter sent to an address they are no longer at,
even though the PHA had no resource to offer the person at the time the letter was
sent, but was simply "updating" its list. For those who do make it through to the eligibility determination process, a seemingly endless stream of verification require-
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merits, often for pieces of

paper a homeless person cannot possibly obtain, 12 creates

"paper chase" that inevitably winnows down the number of applicants able
complete the course. Finally, because the notices and appeal procedures used by
many PHAs and private subsidized owners lack the basic rudiments of due process,
applicants are frequently unable to effectively utilize the appeal process to vindicate
their right to receive subsidized housing resources.
a

literal

to

None

is required by federal law, although some, such
appear to be encouraged by HUD. Some may be motivated in part by concerns of administrative efficiency. None was designed explicitly
13
to exclude the homeless. However, in each of these respects, PHAs are unfortu-

of these procedural barriers

as the purging of the

lists,

nately following in the steps of other bureaucracies seeking to limit the

number of

applicants found eligible, without publicly admitting that they are narrowing the
gibility rules,

eli-

with the effect of making the perceived need for subsidized housing

substantially less than the reality.

PHAs may also, by creating such procedural hurdles, be

purposely trying to

exclude those least able to negotiate the obstacle course: the least
articulate, the least

literate,

the least

mobile (to get around to the required verification sources), and

those without stable addresses. These are likely to be the poorest of the applicants,
disproportionately language and/or racial minorities, and the handicapped. Such
exclusionary tactics

may be motivated

prejudice.

— a desire not
— and/or by

simply by localism

scarce housing resources to people not seen as "theirs"

Whatever the motivation, advocates

to distribute

racial or class

needy in general,
no proper place in

for the housing

as well as the homeless, should expose such policies as having

government-funded housing programs and work to eliminate them.
All these procedural barriers are subject to legal challenge or could be altered
by state-level rule making or legislation, as briefly suggested above, as well as, of
course, by changes in federal regulations or statute. Such changes would benefit
not only homeless applicants, but all applicants for public and subsidized housing
resources. Why have few such challenges been brought? Probably because subsidized housing admissions issues have not been a primary focus of legal effort since
initial, basic reforms were accomplished in the late sixties and early seventies, after
federally

funded

legal services

were

first available,

such as waiting

arbitrary exclusions of classes of potentially eligible applicants,

lists,

proscribing

and rudimentary

notice and hearing requirements.

From

the perspective of clients

coming these procedural

who

are desperate for housing, however, over-

barriers, particularly after the

implementation of the fed-

means to solving the clients' most critical problem.
Such advocacy can not only help numerous individual clients as well as applicants

eral preferences,

overall, but

is

often the

can also eliminate structural barriers to homeless applicants' being able

to benefit equally

from publicly funded housing programs.

Discrimination

A significant proportion of the homeless, particularly of people without minor
children,

meet the federal

definitions of "disabled" or handicapped."

As

a result,

they meet not only the basic categorical eligibility requirement federal law has

imposed on single applicants for housing, 14 but are eligible for special
handicapped housing resources, in addition to family housing.

795

elderly/
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Some

local housing authorities

and private subsidized owners have unlawfully
and the mobility-impaired

restricted elderly/handicapped housing to the elderly

handicapped,

who need

the alleged special amenities of such housing, prohibiting

access to other handicapped and disabled persons. In

some

areas these unlawful

practices have resulted in subsidized housing units remaining vacant because the

—

—

aged applicants
those actually sixty-two and over
may not wish to go into the
available units because of the neighborhood in which they are located. In addition,
because relatively few such actually elderly applicants are entitled to federal preference, compared, for example, with the actually homeless or precariously housed disabled or handicapped, even if there were not units standing vacant, eliminating such
discrimination should result in relatively rapid offers of turnover housing resources
to applicants with federal preference status.

15

In addition to removing such blanket exclusions of the non-mobility impaired

disabled and handicapped from housing for which federal law
it

will also

makes them

be necessary, to open up such housing resources and

housing resources to

many

of the

now

all

eligible,

other family

homeless, to eliminate tenant suitability stan-

dards, which have a discriminatory impact

on the handicapped,

particularly the

men-

A landmark case on this issue was recently won. Although the
judgment technically applies only to the local PHA, HUD has written instructions
to all PHAs to follow the court's ruling in that case, as HUD has agreed that the
court's decision
required by the Fair Housing Act Amendments, which HUD
tally

16

handicapped.

is

bound to uphold.
Even with such

is

instructions, however,

tions will not automatically

if

past experience

be complied with. As

HUD

is

is

a guide, the instruc-

notorious for failing to

PHAs, and particularly private owners, actual enforcement will require
and local-level vigilance. In addition, other common PHA or private subsidized owner systematic exclusions of applicants on suitability grounds, such as
denials for prior records of "bad" tenancies, despite proof of subsequent rehabilitation from the substance abuse that caused the prior bad acts of failure to pay rent,
damage to the apartment, and so on, may be challengeable on handicap

supervise
state-

discrimination grounds. This

is

a fertile area for creative legal work.

Long-term Questions about Subsidy

Eligibility

In any single year, and perhaps over an even longer time frame, advocacy targeted at

who gets

available subsidized housing resources

is

admittedly a strategy that does not

get beyond a zero-sum game, except in the instances

being used. Therefore, focusing on access and
less, particularly

preference rules,

17

is

it is

and affordable housing programs.

a critical service to our arguably most needy clients. But

is

when housing lawyer

colleagues challenge this

on the

Titanic,"

it

would be preferable

is

work

as "merely rearranging the

deck

to have a better response than that

the applicants are not equally likely to drown.

While there

on behalf of the home-

a sufficient justification that obtaining housing subsidies for other-

wise homeless clients
chairs

available subsidies are not

potentially divisive of the broader constituency

for increasing the supply of housing benefits

Perhaps

when

eligibility issues

all

18

not yet evidence to prove the proposition in the housing context,

recent experience in other social welfare programs suggests that a potentially

196

expansive dynamic can result from making visible the "holes in the safety net." For
example, concerted publicity about the cutoff of SSI and Social Security Disability
benefits by the Reagan administration's severe review policy finally prompted not
only judicial, but also congressional sanction to ensure that the disabled continued

Congress also redressed a few of the eligibility
had imposed on the AFDC and food stamp programs, after hearing
evidence that the harm inflicted was more severe than intended.
Similarly, one hoped-for result of struggling to expand subsidized housing priority
for the homeless, in the rules both as written and as applied, is that increasing the
number of applicants acknowledged to be entitled to preference will make the need
even more visible, with a consequent increase in resources to respond to the need.
True, homelessness is already the most visible part of the housing crisis. But many
policymakers, as well as members of the public, nonetheless believe that the hometo receive benefits. In the mid-1980s,

restrictions

less are

it

without housing because they are

somehow

not "housing ready" or don't

want housing. Such detractions from the fundamental claim to housing should be
undercut by cold proof of the numbers of applicants found eligible and entitled to
priority status for subsidized housing whose needs cannot be met.
In addition, to the extent that housing authorities, legislators, and/or better-off
applicants

on the waiting

others, the challenge

is

lists

object to the homeless being served "instead of"

to enlist the energy of these potentially

more

politically

expand the supply of resources. Such hoped-for
alliances may require that new resources be targeted to broader eligibility groups
than the already homeless. But if the pot can truly be expanded more than homeless
advocates could accomplish on their own, such an alliance is of general benefit.
The second major question raised by pursuing strategies to increase access to
public and subsidized housing is whether increased centralization and standardization of programs and rules is really going to help low-income applicants in general,
and homeless applicants in particular, over the long run. Advocacy pressure toward
both centralization of formerly locally administered programs, and increased specification of eligibility rules and procedures, has been a key element of the welfare
rights strategy for the last twenty-five years. While some proponents of progressive
welfare programs have criticized these strategies for rigidifying welfare decision
making, 19 and it is certainly true that rules can be as exclusionary as unfettered
discretion, on balance it appears that the politically disfavored are generally best
off when programs for their benefit are administered at a level more distant from
local prejudice, and when decisions must be made in accordance with rules subject
influential

to review.

Even

groups

in the struggle to

20

one accepts these general lessons drawn from the social welfare context,
is still a question whether the nature of housing programs requires
or suggests an answer different from one in the welfare context. Arguably, the local
if

however, there

nature of housing construction programs, with the inevitable issues of zoning, neigh-

borhood mix, and the like, require as much locally based support as can be mustered. Even if that is true for construction programs, however, walk-around subsidies
such as the federal Section 8 program are essentially income maintenance programs
in a housing guise: they are income supplements earmarked for housing needs. Program beneficiaries are dispersed in the community, in whatever private units they
can locate.

No local support for building

additional housing

197

is

necessary. Conse-
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quently, whatever arguments for local administration of housing construction programs there may be do not appear to apply to programs that operate strictly as

rent subsidies.

While

21

this discussion of the

long-term implications of the strategies to increase

access to existing subsidies and public/subsidized housing
it

suggests that a

more thorough

is

necessarily preliminary,

analysis of similar strategies used in other social

welfare programs would be very helpful in the evolution of strategies to reform the
administration of housing programs to meet the needs of our most low-income

citi-

While such inquiry continues, however, and while efforts to increase housing
resources go on, advocates should not overlook the substantial promise strategies

zens.

such as those discussed in
for homeless clients,

this article

hold for creating real housing opportunities

fa
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dated January 12, 1990, from Frank Keating, general counsel of HUD, to Alex
"We find nothing in the United States
Housing Act of 1937 or other Federal law which would constitute a legal impediment to PHAs

10. In a letter

Bledsoe, then deputy secretary of EOCD, Keating stated,
following State-directed preferences for the homeless."

The

a state housing agency, rather than a state legislature, could

preference for the homeless on
11.
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says that whether
impose such state-required
letter also

a question of state, not federal law.
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their Section 8 programs, although they do follow different tenant selection procedures in
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of the earliest clients of the

type of Catch-22 that

a result of the abandonment of his single-room-occupancy building by
subsequent condemnation. The PHA in his hometown, a working-class
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as a tenant before it would approve him for public housing. Of course he couldn't provide
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After our office intervened and threatened to sue if the PHA didn't at least issue a decision on
our client's eligibility based on his having provided all the requested verification he could
obtain, the PHA accepted our client as a tenant, and he was housed within ten days!
less for

two years as

the owner, and

its

homeless advocates pointed out to officials of the Boston Housing Authority the particuadverse effect on homeless applicants of the BHA's requirements that applicants list all
their "residences" in the prior five years and provide verification other than from relatives from
each location, the BHA official in charge readily conceded that BHA had never looked at its
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15.
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assist the mentally handicapped to maintain their tenancies, and not whether advocates seek
to enforce the rights of the handicapped to public and subsidized housing.
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